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Vaughan v. Southern Railway Co. chose to adopt the new Miller rule
holding that the citizenship of the beneficiary would be controlling for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. In this process the Vaughan court so
distorted the section 1359 standard of review as defined by the Fourth
Circuit's trilogy of diversity jurisdiction decisions that the application
of the "stake" and "motive" elements of the standard was rendered
largely unrecognizable. This application, in effect, served only to jus-
tify an essentially bare application of the Miller rule itself. Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit's application of the Miller rule was built upon a
questionable foundation. In addition, the rule itself, in light of its own
inherent weaknesses and in comparison to the preferred reform pro-
posal, possesses dubious future utility. Thus, in its barest elements the
Vaughan decision represents the Fourth Circuit's indulgence in the
final statges of a process of judicial rule-making. However, this pro-
cess and the search for an alternate rule of decision in the jurisdic-
tional controversy must be said to have ultimately foundered.
THOMAS A. MURPHY, 3R.
Constitutional Law—Taxpayer's Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination—DJ/ter v. United States.' In the consoli-
dated case of Fisher v. United States, 2 the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege prevents
enforcement of a documentary summons directed toward his attorney
for the production of his accountant's workpapers which had been
transferred to the attorney by the taxpayer. 3 Faced with an investiga-
tion by the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) for possible civil and
criminal tax liability, the taxpayers in United States v. Fisher' and United
States v. Kasmir 5 obtained certain documents from their accountants
and transferred them to their attorneys.6 Shortly after the transfer,
the I.R.S. served a summons on each of the attorneys to compel their
production of the transferred documents.' When the attorneys re-
' 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Two cases, Fisher v. United States, 500 F.2d 683 (3rd Cir.
1974), and United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), were consolidated be-
cause of the identity of issues and the conflict between the courts of appeals' decisions.
2 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
3 Id. at 394.
' 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 500 F.2d 683 (3rd Cir. 1974), affd, sub
nom. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
5 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), rest(' 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The district court opin-
ion is unpublished.
425 U.S. at 394. The documents transferred in Kasmir consisted of the accoun•
tant's workpapers, copies of correspondence between the accountant and the taxpayer,
and copies of the taxpayer's tax returns for three years. In Fisher, the taxpayers trans-
ferred their accountant's analyses of their income and expenses, based upon informa-
tion copied from the taxpayer's checks and deposit receipts. Id.
7 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1970) provides authority to summon books and records in
the following language:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, mak-
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fused to produce them, the I.R.S., acting pursuant to its statutory au-
thority, instituted enforcement proceedings' In. both cases, the attor-
neys claimed that the documents were privileged under the fourthp
and fifth" amendments as well as under the attorney-client
privilege."
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania ordered the summons enforced in Fisher because the pa-
pers were owned by the accountant and the taxpayer's possession did
not give rise to a fifth amendment priVilege. 12 In Kasmir, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas also upheld
the summons on the ground that the documents were owned by the
accounting firm and in the possession of the attorney at the time of
the summons." In both cases, however, the courts stayed the sum-
monses pending appeal." On appeal, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit affirmed in Fisher, holding that since the
records had been prepared and maintained by the accountant, the
taxpayers' temporary possession did not give rise to a fifth amend-
ment privilege." In contrast, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in Kasmir, reasoning that when
ing a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any
person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of
any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal rev-
enue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is au-
thorized—
(1) to examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may
be relevant or material to such inquiry
Id. 26 U.S.C. § 7402(b) (1970) provides in relevant part:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to ap-
pear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district
court of the United States For the district in which such person resides or
may be found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel
such attendance, testimony, or production of hooks, papers, or other data.
26 U.S.C. § 7604 (1970) provides jurisdiction for enforcement by the same means in
substantially the same language.
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. This amendment provides: "No person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...."
" 425 U.S. at 395. A confidential communication between an individual and his
attorney is privileged if made in the course of seeking legal advice or otherwise elicited
in a transaction having its basis in the attorney-client relationship. 8 WICMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2292 at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 358
(1891). The privilege exists to ensure freedom of consultation of an individual with his
attorney in order to ascertain his legal rights and responsibilities. See 8 WicmoRE, Ey:-
2291 at 545 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
352 F. Supp. at 734.
;3 499 F.2d at 447.
"425 U.S. at 395.
13 500 F.2d at 692.
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the taxpayer obtained actual possession of the accountants' papers he
gained the right under the fifth amendment to refuse to produce the
documents and that that right was not lost by transfer of the docu-
ments to his attorney."
Affirming Fisher and reversing Kasmir, the Supreme Court
HELD: Accountant's workpapers are not privileged under the fifth
amendment in the hands of either the taxpayer or his attorney when
the act of producing the papers in response to a summons involves no
compelled testimonial self-incrimination of the taxpayer." The Court
reasoned that because a documentary summons directed to a tax-
payer's attorney involves no "physical or moral compulsion" against
the taxpayer himself, his fifth amendment privilege does not im-
munize the documents from production by the attorney." The Court
also determined that the taxpayers themselves were unable to assert a
fifth amendment privilege since, under the particular facts of Fisher,
their production of their accountants' documents would not constitute
a testimonial statement as to the truth of the contents of the papers."
Thus, the taxpayers' production of the documents would not result in
testimonial self-incrimination and hence could not qualify for fifth
amendment protection. 2° As to the taxpayers' fourth amendment
claim, the Court concluded that the means used to obtain the docu-
ments did not unconstitutionally intrude into an area in which the
taxpayer had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 2 ' Therefore, no vio-
lation of the fourth amendment could be shown. 22
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the Fisher judgment,
but expressed reservations about its implications with respect to the
protection of the privacy of documents." Justice Brennan regarded
the papers as having a "wholly business rather than personal na-
ture."24
 The documents therefore could not be privileged under the
fifth amendment's protection of private books and papers. His fear,
however, was that the impact of the Court's opinion on protection was
"but another step in the denigration of privacy principles." 25 Justice
Marshall, too, expressed concern over the failure of the Court to in-
clude in its mode of analysis some consideration of the documents'
contents." Because the Court's analysis focused on technical aspects of
production rather than on the contents of the documents themselves,
Justice Marshall apparently viewed the Court's opinion as demonstrat-
ing less concern for protecting sensitive material than for procedural
16
 499 F.2d at 452.
" 425 U.S. at 414.
" Id. at 397, quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918).
425 U.S. at 413,
"See id.
" See id. at 401 n.7, 414.
" See id.
"Id. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 430 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"Id. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring).
"Id. (D rennan, J., concurring).
" Id. at 432 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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safeguards. 27 He was confident, however, that future applications of
the Court's mode of analysis would continue to protect the privacy of
documents because, although technically the act of production will be
the factor considered in determining fifth amendment protection, in
practice, privacy will continue to be an important consideration. 28
The primary significance of the Supreme Court's decision in
Fisher lies in its establishment of a three-pronged test for determining
the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled
testimonial self-incrimination." This test serves to supply a rationale
for immunizing an individual from producing incriminating docu-
ments,3° and replaces an older policy of attempting to immunize doc-
uments based on an ad hoc consideration of the private character of
their contents." The policy of immunity for private papers was first
articulated by the Court in Boyd v. United States,'" which broadly held
that the compelled production of an individual's books and papers to
be used against him in legal proceedings violates both the fourth and
fifth amendments. 33 More recently, however, the Court has limited
Boyd's holding. Introduction of purely evidentiary but non-testimonial
evidence has been held not violative of the fifth amendment" and sei-
zure of testimonial evidence which is not the result of compulsion has
been held not to violate the fourth amendment." Given these inroads
into Boyd's policy of immunity, Fisher represents an attempt by the
Court to supply a consistent rationale for establishing when the fifth
amendment protects documents from summons.
This note will initially examine the Court's reasoning in reaching
the conclusion that the attorney-client privilege immunizes an attorney
from producing accountant's workpapers transferred to him by his
taxpayer-client only if the documents would have been privileged in
the hands of the taxpayer. Next, it will set forth the reasons why the
taxpayers themselves in Fisher were not allowed to invoke a fifth
amendment defense. It will then analyze the Court's application of its
three-pronged compelled testimonial incrimination test to the particu-
lar facts of Fisher. Drawing on this analysis, an attempt will be made to
define each of the three elements of the test. This note will also ad-
dress Justice Brennan's fear that under the Court's three-pronged test
private papers do not receive adequate protection against docu-
mentary summons. Additionally, protection of privacy will be dis-
cussed with a view toward determining whether the fifth amendment
affords a "safe harbor" for documents of a private or confidential na-
37 See id, at 430-34 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"Id. at 433 (Marshall, J., concurring).
a" 425 U.S. at 399. See text at notes 67-117 infra.
" 425 U.S. at 409.
31 Id. at 431, 434 (Marshall, J., concurring).
32 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See discussion of Boyd at notes 58.62 infra.
33 Id. at 634-35.
34
 Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1967);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-65 (1966).
35 See Katz v, United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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ture. Finally, an examination will be made of whether, under the
three-pronged test, personal records maintained for the purpose of
filing tax returns are immune from compelled production.
I. PROTECTION OF A TAXPAYER'S RECORDS IN THE HANDS OF
HIS ATTORNEY
In reaching its decision in Fisher, the Court first addressed the
question of whether the taxpayers' fifth amendment privilege excused
their attorneys from producing the documents demanded either on
the basis of the attorney-client privilege 36
 or on the theory of the
principal-agent relationship." The Court noted that it had repeatedly
held that the fifth amendment protects only against the use of "physi-
cal or moral compulsion" against the accused himself and accordingly
may not be invoked on another person's behalf." Since the only com-
pulsion involved in Fisher was brought to bear on the attorneys and
not on the taxpayers, the Court concluded that the taxpayers' fifth
amendment privilege did not immunize their attorneys from produc-
36
 425 U,S. at 396. The fifth amendment provides a privilege protecting an in-
dividual from being forced to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution.
U.S. ,CoNsT. amend. V. That privilege extends beyond the courtroom to prevent any
use of "physical or moral compulsion" brought to bear against an accused to compel
him to divulge or relinquish evidence to be used against him. See Perlman v. United
States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918). Additionally, the privilege protects against compelled pro-
duction of pre-existing documents when their use as evidence would tend to incriminate
the producer. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). But see Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (corporate documents are not protected by the privilege).
37 425 U.S. at 397-98,
"Id, See. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), holding that the privilege may only
be invoked for the protection of the witness and not to protect another party. Id. at 74.
The Hale Court based its conclusion upon the rationale that
[t]he right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to in-
criminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness. It was never
intended to permit him to plead the fact that some third person might be
incriminated by his testimony, even though he were the agent of such per-
son.
Id. at 69-70. The Court therefore held that a witness may not invoke the privilege to
prevent the incrimination of a corporation of which he is an agent. The Court further
developed this line of reasoning in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), in re-
futing the contention that an accountant could claim a fifth amendment privilege from
producing his client's tax records. The Court reasoned that the summons directed
against the accountant was enforceable because
[h]e, not the taxpayer, is the only one compelled to do anything. And the
accountant makes no claim that he may tend to be incriminated by the
production. Inquisitorial pressure or coercion against a potentially accused
person, compelling him, against his will, to utter self-condemning words or
produce incriminating documents is absent.
Id. at 329. It was this pronouncement upon which the Fisher Court based its observation
that an attorney could not claim the fifth amendment privilege of his client simply be-
cause he held documents which the client sought to protect from summons. That
privilege could only be involved if the client could assert a valid fifth amendment claim
which, by virtue of the attorney-client privilege, would lead to their protection in the at-
torney's hands. See 425 U.S. at 397-98. 402-05.
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ing the accountants' workpapers.36 The Court found particular sup-
port for this conclusion in its decision in Couch v. United States." In
Couch a subpoena was served upon a taxpayer's accountant directing
him to deliver records pertaining to the taxpayer's tax liability.'" The
taxpayer intervened, asserting ownership of the documents and a fifth
amendment privilege protecting them from production.'" The Court,
however, held that the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege did not
immunize his accountant from producing documents prepared by him
and retained in his possession.'" The Court reasoned that Fisher was
similar to Couch because a subpoena directed to a third party, whether
the taxpayer's accountant or his attorney, involves no compulsion
upon the taxpayer himself, and therefore does not violate, his fifth
amendment privilege."
In reaching its conclusion that the attorney's compelled produc-
tion of documents does not violate the taxpayers' fifth amendment
privilege, the Court considered and rejected several other defense
contentions. The first of these was that the relinquishment of control
of the accountant's workpapers.by the taxpayer was temporary and
constituted continuous constructive possession by the taxpayer. 45 In
Couch, the Court had reasoned that a taxpayer's relinquishment of
control of potentially incriminating documents could be so in-
significant and impermanent as to leave the risk of personal compul-
sion on the taxpayer substantially intact." No constructive possession
was found in that case, however, because the length of time the doc-
uments were in the possession of the accountant was so significant as
to leave no personal compulsion upon the taxpayer.'" The Court
found no material difference between the relinquishment of control
of the documents to the attorney in Fisher and the relinquishment to
the accountant in Couch." Consequently, although constructive posses-
sion might be found in some circumstances, such a finding was not
justified in Fisher."
Again relying on the premise that the fifth amendment only pro-
tects a person from being compelled to be a witness against himsqf, the
Court rejected a second defense contention. The defense argued that
the fifth amendment privilege should not be forfeited because an in-
dividual has given documents to his lawyer in order to obtain legal
advice." This argument had provided the basis for the Fifth Circuit's
32 Id.
40 409 U.S. 322 (1973), noted in 15 B.C. i ND. & COMM. L. REV. 185 (1973).
'' Id, at 324-5.
42 Id, at 325.
"id. at 335.
44 425 U.S. at 397.
42 425 U.S. at 398.
"409 U.S. at 333.
4 ' Id. at 333-34.
42 425 U.S. at 398.
49 Id.
22 Id. at 399,
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decision in Kasmir that the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege was
not lost when he transferred his accountant's workpapers to his attor-
ney. 5 ' In reaching this decision, the Fifth Circuit had held that the
taxpayer had a legitimate expectation of privacy in transferring the
documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, and therefore
did not forfeit his fifth amendment privilege by transferring them. 52
However, the Supreme Court determined that although the attorney
had an obligation to respect the confidences of his client, protection of
privacy is not within the scope of the fifth amendment but rather that
of the fourth which directly addresses the issue of protection of pri-
vacy.53 Accordingly, the Fisher Court concluded that any protection of
privacy interests under the fifth amendment may be found only when
the acquisition of private information involves compelled testimonial
self-incrimination. 54
 Since the transfer of the documents meant they
could be subpoenaed from the attorneys without compulsion on the
taxpayers, the attorneys could not claim the taxpayers' fifth amend-
ment privilege to immunize the documents from production. 55
II. THE TAXPAYERS' FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
Although the Court determined that the taxpayers' fifth
amendment privilege did not excuse their attorneys from producing
the accountants' workpapers, it agreed with both petitioners and re-
spondents that if the papers were privileged by reason of the fifth
amendment in the taxpayers' hands and were transferred to the at-
torneys for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the attorney-client
privilege would preclude their compelled production. 56 Since the tax-
payers in Fisher had turned the documents over to their attorneys for
such a purpose, the Court addressed itself to the question of whether
the documents would have been obtainable by summons when they
were in the taxpayer's possession."
In determining whether or not the taxpayer had a fifth amend-
ment privilege, the Court initially considered Boyd v. United States." In
Boyd, the government had obtained an order forcing two partners to
" 499 F.2d at 452.
"Id. at 452-53. The "legitimate expectation of privacy" which the Fifth Circuit
felt the taxpayer enjoyed derives from Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
The Court held in Couch that "no Fourth or Fifth Amendment claims can prevail
where, as in this case, there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no
semblance of governmental compulsion against the person of the accused." Id. at 336.
The Court did not expound, however, upon what constitutes a "legitimate expectation
of privacy;" the Fifth Circuit's attempt to define its own standards was overturned by
the Supreme Court in Fisher. The Fisher Court did, however, make passing obeisance to
the concept of privacy. See text at notes 125.45 infra.
53 425 U.S. at 400.
54 Id.
55 See id. at 402.
"Id. at 402-05.
51 Id. at 405.
58
 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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produce an incriminating invoice over their fifth amendment objec-
tions." On these facts, the Boyd Court ruled that forcing an individual
to produce his private books and papers to be used as evidence
against him was a violation of both the fourth and fifth amend-
ments." Boyd, therefore, is the source of the proposition that com-
pelled production of incriminating documents may be prevented by
invoking the fifth amendment."' The Court noted, however, that a
series of cases had limited Boyd's holding so that the fifth amendment
privilege can now exist only when the compelled production of docu-
ments involves a testimonial communication that tends to incriminate
the person attempting to assert the privilege." The Court then looked
to the facts in Fisher to determine whether the three prerequisites of a
fifth amendment claim—compulsion, testimony and self-incrim-
ination—were present.
The first prerequisite of a fifth amendment claim, compulsion,
was found by the Court to be clearly present in the form of a sub-
poena.° 3 Additionally, the Court implicitly assumed the existence of
the third element, incrimination." The fifth amendment does not
protect against the compelled production of incriminating evidence
without more, however." It is only when that evidence is the result of
a testimonial communication or act which links the incriminating evi-
dence to the. accused that the incrimination becomes self-
incrimination. 06 Thus the key to fifth amendment protection, the ele-
ment that transforms mere incriminating evidence into self-
" Id. at 618.
g" Id. at 634-35.
" 425 U.S. at 405.
13 Id. at 407-09. See text at notes 34-35 supra. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 765 (1966), the Court declined to extend fifth amendment protection to cover the
withdrawal of incriminating blood samples from an individual since it was neither peti-
tioner's testimony nor did it relate to any communicative act by him. Handwriting
exemplars have also been held to fall outside fifth amendment protection, Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967), as has the act of donning a particular piece of
clothing for purposes of identification in court. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245
(1910). The privilege protecting an individual from producing incriminating documents
does not cover the records of a corporation, Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382
(1910), of an unincorporated association, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944),
or of a partnership, Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 95 (1974). The basis of the ex-
clusion of artificial persons and organizations from fifth amendment protection is the
intent to limit its protection "to its historic function of protecting only the natural in-
dividual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal rec-
ords." United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944).
63 425 U.S. at 409.
Al See id. at 410-11. "[Hiowever incriminating the documents might be, the act of
producing them ... would not itself' involve testimonial self-incrimination." The ten-
dency in the federal courts is to allow a witness wide latitude in making a claim of fifth
amendment privilege, lest the witness incriminate himself by revealing the nature of the
evidence in the very attempt to establish the privilege. 8 W1GMORE, EVIDENce 2271 at
425 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
"" See Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913)1 "A party is privileged
from producing evidence but not from its production."
" Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
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incrimination, is the testimonial aspect of its production by the ac-
cused. 67 The testimonial aspect of production was the most important
element in Fisher, and would presumably be the most important ele-
ment in most cases involving a fifth amendment privilege, since com-
pulsion and incrimination usually will be easily discernible.
The question of whether or not a testimonial link existed be-
tween the incriminating evidence and the taxpayers was difficult to re-
solve in Fisher. As the Court indicated, the act of producing the doc-
uments did not involve testimony in the ordinary sense because there
was no oral testimony. Thus the taxpayers were not required to "re-
state, repeat or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents
sought."" Because testimony in the ordinary sense of an oral state-
ment by a witness was not present, the mere fact that the papers
might incriminate the taxpayers was insufficient to give rise to a fifth
amendment privilege. As the Court stated, "the privilege protects a
person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimo-
nial communications."" Thus the Court's concern in Fisher was to find
the testimonial link between the taxpayers and the potentially in-
criminating records, because if that testimonial link were found, the
compelled production of the papers would be precluded by the fifth
amendment.
Since in this instance the communications were not those of the
taxpayers, but of the accountants, and since their preparation was
wholly voluntary, the taxpayers' fifth amendment privilege did not
necessarily apply even though the documents themselves potentially
were incriminating." Nevertheless, the Court found that the act of
production itself could have communicative aspects: responding to the
subpoena could be an implicit acknowledgement of the existence of
the documents and their possession or control by the taxpayer." Fur-
thermore, producing the documents in response to a subpoena could
"[rise] to the level of testimony" within the fifth amendment protec-
tion if it had the effect of implicitly authenticating them as those de-
scribed in the subpoena." The Court stated, however, that whether
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2265 at 386 (McNaughton rev. 1961) explains the con-
cept of a "testimonial communication" in this way: "Unless some attempt is made to se-
cure a communication — written, oral or otherwise — upon which reliance is to be
placed as involving [the witness'] consciousness of the facts and the operations of his
mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him is not a testimonial one."
" 425 U.S. at 409.
eB Id. Evidence which represents testimonial and incriminating communication
but which was not compelled at the time of its utterance is not privileged from sub-
poena. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967). Nor does the fifth amendment
protect incriminating evidence which is the product of compulsion but which is of a
non-testimonial or non-communicative nature. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
765 (1966).
7° 425 U.S. at 409-10.
71 1d. at 410.
72 1d. at 911. The Court cited Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957), for
the proposition that producing documents in response to a subpoena can constitute im-
plicit testimony. Curcio involved the contempt citation of a union leader who refused
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such "tacit averments" would constitute testimonial incrimination de-
pends on the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case."
The Court then applied these concepts to the specific facts of
Fisher and concluded that admitting the existence and possession of
the papers did not constitute a testimonial admission. 74 The Court
grounded its conclusion on two findings: first, production of the doc-
uments amounted to no more than turning over another's workpa-
pers; and second, the whereabouts of those papers was already
known. 75
 Further, the taxpayers had not prepared the documents,
were unable to vouch for their accuracy, and presumably had never
even seen them before the I.R.S. investigation." Because of their un-
familiarity with the accountants' papers, the Court observed that pro-
ducing the potentially incriminating documents in response to a sub-
poena would neither authenticate them nor be an implicit voucher for
their contents. 77
 Rather, the act of production would indicate only
that the taxpayers believed the papers to be the ones demanded."
Thus, the Court held that complying with the summons did not con-
stitute testimonial incrimination and therefore did not fall within the
protection of' the fifth amendment. 79
either to produce union records in response to a grand jury subpoena or to testify as to
their location. Id. at 119. The Court held that, although the witness could be compelled
to produce the records, the fifth amendment prevented his being forced to testify as to
their whereabouts. Id. at 123. In so holding, the Court observed that
[tike custodians' act of producing books or records in response to a sub-
poena duces iecum is itself a representation that the documents produced
are those demanded by the subpoena. Requiring the custodian to identify
or authenticate the documents for admission to evidence merely makes
explicit what is implicit in the production itself.
Id. at 125. This view of the production of documents as a testimonial identification
echoes the view of Wigmore, who finds production which is compelled by legal process
to be equal to the producer's assurance of the authenticity of the documents. 8 Wm.
MORE EVIDENCE, 2264 at 380 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See text at notes 106-13 infra,
73 425 U.S. at 410.
74 Id. at 411.
" Id.
79 Id. Indeed, one of the taxpayers turned his accountant's documents over to his
attorney "within minutes" of receiving them from the accountant. 499 F.2d at 446.
"425 U.S. at 412-13.79 Id.
79 Id. at 414. In Fisher the taxpayers had put their tax affairs in the hands of their
accountants, and had no more than a general knowledge of the contents of the docu-
ments subpoenaed. Id. at 413. In Couch v, United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the tax-
payer had also relinquished control of her tax records; it may be inferred that her per-
sonal knowledge of her accountant's records was no better than the taxpayers' in Fisher.
Id, at 334. If, however, the taxpayer had worked with the accountant in preparing the
documents, or at least had significant familiarity with their contents, those documents
would presumably fall within the scope of fifth amendment protection; their compelled
production by the taxpayer would necessarily involve the taxpayer's voucher for their
accuracy or, in Wigmore's terms, the taxpayer's "assurances .. . that the documents
produced are the ones demanded." See 8 WIGMOREn EVIDENCE § 2264 at 380
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
1007
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE PREREQUISITES
OF A FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
It is clear from the holding in Fisher that a document is immune
from summons if the act of producing it results in compelled testimo-
nial self-incrimination. The absence of any one of those three ele-
ments precludes fifth amendment protection." In Fisher the Court
readily found compulsion," and assumed that the documents con-
tained incriminating information," but found the act of production to
be non-testimonial." Absent the element of testimony, there could be
no protection under the fifth amendment." Since the Court left the
determination of the existence of the three elements open for a case-
by-case consideration, it is necessary to examine the criteria used by
the Court to reach its decision in Fisher to establish a framework of
analysis for future cases. The three-pronged test must therefore be
further examined.
The Court analyzed each of the three elements on an individual
basis. The first, compulsion, was present in Fisher in the form of a
subpoena. 85 The rationale of the fifth amendment is to prevent extor-
tion of incriminating evidence from an individual. 8° Because the gov-
ernment is regarded as having resources vastly superior to those of
the individual, historic concepts of fair play demand that the burden
of proving guilt be put on the government, while at the same time
denying it the ability to exert pressure on the individual to supply
evidence against himself." Pressure can be exerted effectively in many
ways. The Court was satisfied that a subpoena directed against an in-
dividual "involves substantial compulsion." 88 The individual served
must either comply or risk sanctions; his compliance is coerced and he
is forced to supply, against his will, information he wishes withheld.
Thus the extraction of evidence by use of a subpoena represents
compulsion within the protection of the fifth amendment.
The second element of the test, testimony, may be less suscepti-
ble to identification. Although no oral statements or affirmations were
required to be made by the taxpayers in Fisher, the Court reasoned
that other, less obvious forms of testimonial communications could
80 425 U.S. at 408.
" Id. at 409.
92 Id. at 410-11. See notes 64 supra.
53
 425 U.S. at 411.
"Id. at 408.
85 1d. at 409.
BB
 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). See also In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967):
One of [the] purposes [of the privilege against self-incrimination] is to pre-
vent the state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from
overcoming the mind and will of a person under investigation and depriv-
ing him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his
conviction.
87 See In re Gault 387 U.S. I, 55 (1967).
68 425 U.S. at 409.
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arise from the act of producing the documents itself." Under some
circumstances producing documents could amount to a showing both
that the papers existed and that they were in the possession of the
producer, thus supplying an important testimonial link in the chain of
evidence to which the government would not otherwise have access. 9°
The Court apparently found the production of the documents in
Fisher to be non-testimonial because it would not indicate either the
existence or the location of the documents." Since there was no ques-
tion as to their whereabouts, production could add little or nothing to
the government's case." Because the government gained no informa-
tion from the act of production itself, the Court treated it as strictly
non-communicative and therefore non-testimonial. In this regard it is
important to distinguish testimonial evidence from real or circumstan-
tial evidence. The latter involve the introduction into evidence of an
object or set of facts from which the trier of fact may decide, either
directly or by inference, the truth or falsity of the proposition as-
serted." Testimonial evidence, on the other hand, is an assertion by
an individual of the truth or falsity of the fact; from that assertion the
trier of fact may draw his own conclusions." It is only testimonial evi-
dence which finds protection under the fifth amendment. Accord-
ingly, the extraction of a blood sample has been held, in Schmerber v.
California," to be beyond the scope of the fifth amendment since a
blood sample, "although an incriminating product of compulsion, was
neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some com-
municative act or writing by the petitioner."" It was found that evi-
dence is inadmissible only when it requires an individual "to be a wit-
ness against himself."97 To do so he must in some way make a tes-
timonial or communicative assertion." An individual submitting to the
taking of a blood sample makes no testimonial assertion other than
that he has blood in his veins. Since that is a foregone conclusion, it is
not relevant testimony. Similarly, the taxpayer in Fisher, by producing
the workpapers, would admit that they existed and were in his posses-
sion." Yet, since neither fact was in question'°° the Court viewed
those admissions as non-testimonial.'" It would appear then that
whenever the production of incriminating evidence does not involve
the producer's express or implied voucher for its truth, its existence,
a"fd, at 410.
"° Id.
91 id. at 411-12.
at411.
"See 1 WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE §§ 24, 25 at 396-401 (3d ed. 1940).
"Id. § 24 at 398.
" 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
"a Id. at 765.
"Id. at 761.
"Id. at 764.
" 425 U.S. at 411-12.
'" Id.
lol Id.
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its whereabouts, or for conclusions derived from it, no testimonial as-
sertion exists.'" Only when the government gains information
through the actions of the accused can there be a testimonial com-
munication. Since the government knows that an individual must have
blood, forcing the accused to submit to the taking of a sample forces
him to admit nothing; the conclusions the government can draw from
that sample are non-testimonial. In contrast, if the government had
no knowledge of whether or not a certain document exists or whether
an individual possessed it, compulsion exerted against the individual
to produce the document would constitute a testimonial admission of
both facts.
The third element of the Fisher test, self-incrimination, may be
found when the individual's testimonial communications tend to im-
plicate him in the commission of the act with which he is charged.
Although the withdrawal of blood from a person, for example, may
well lead to incriminating findings, those findings are not assertions of
the individual. Lacking that testimonial link between the evidence and
the individual's testimonial assertions, the evidence is not self-
incriminating as to him. The fact that an individual may be compelled
to submit to a potentially incriminating blood sample or to produce
potentially incriminating documents does not necessarily lead to self-
incrimination. Thus, in such a situation the privilege is not available
"for [it] protects a person only against being incriminated by his own
compelled testimonial communications." 103
Of great significance to the Fisher holding as well as to the future
of the fifth amendment is the Court's examination of the potential for
testimonial incrimination represented by the act of producing docu-
ments. In reaching its result in Fisher, the Court examined the act of
production to determine if it involved implicit authentication. 10' It
reasoned that production could be self-incriminating if, by producing
the documents in response to a subpoena, the taxpayers thereby im-
plicitly identified them as the papers described therein.'" If so, the
act of production would constitute a testimonial link in the chain of
evidence against them. Wigmore refers to this sort of authentication
as "witness' assurance, compelled as an incident of the process, that
102 See State v. Pike, 306 A.2d 145 (Me. 1973). Testimonial evidence "consists of
the testimonial assertions of a competent witness of his perceptional awarenesses of mat-
ters constituting an element of the offense charged and which operate as 'proof' of such
element if believed by the factfinder." /d. at 150, citing Commonwealth v. Webster, 59
Mass. 295 (5 Cush.) (1850). A fact is established by testimonial evidence when "it has
been testified to by witnesses as having come under the cognizance of their senses, and
of [its] truth there seems to be no reasonable doubt or question." State v. Carter, 6 Del.
(1 Roust.) 402, 410 (1873). Wigmore refers to testimonial evidence and the inferences
drawn from it as "the assertions of human beings regarded as the basis of inference to
the propositions asserted by them." 1 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 25 at 398 (3d ed. 1940).
"' 425 U.S. at 409.
' 0 * Id. at 412-14.
' 25 1d. at 410.
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the articles produced are the ones demanded."'" Inasmuch as the in-
dividual vouches for the genuineness of the article produced, his pro-
duction is a testimonial identification.'" That testimonial identifica-
tion of incriminating documents is self-incrimination within the pro-
tection of the fifth amendment.'" Applying that same rationale to the
facts in Fisher Ied the Court to conclude that production would result
in no implicit authentication.' 09 The taxpayers, because of their un-
familiarity with their accountants' workpapers and the preparation
thereof, were in no postion to authenticate the documents orally or
implicitly."° Therefore, the taxpayers' response to the subpoena could
not serve to authenticate them or be a voucher for their genuineness.
Consequently, there could be no testimonial incrimination through the
implicit identification of the papers.
An individual's ability to authenticate thus appears to be a func-
tion of his familiarity with the subpoenaed document, The Fisher
Court noted that the taxpayers "did not produce the documents and
could not vouch for their accuracy."'" It can be inferred from this
statement that the taxpayers, or any individual, could only authenti-
cate documents with which they were familiar, since one having no
knowledge or understanding of a document is presumably incapable
of vouching for its authenticity, either explicitly or implicitly. Since
familiarity apparently is a key aspect of authentication,' it would seem
that if the author of a document were compelled to produce that doc-
ument, the act of production would implicitly authenticate it as the
one demanded. Unlike the taxpayers, the accountants in Fisher, as the
authors of the papers, were clearly the persons most capable of iden-
tifying them and vouching for their contents. An author's authentica-
tion is no less significant simply because the documents may be au-
thenticated by another for purposes of introduction into evidence.'"
Therefore, if a person may not be required orally to authenticate his
own work, he should also not be required to do so implicitly through
the act of production. Under the reasoning of Fisher, then, no docu-
ment may be summoned for use against its author because his act of
production would result in compelled testimonial incrimination. Its
immunity stems not from its contents' potentially incriminating na-
ture, but rather from the author's implicit verification of that in-
criminating material.
1 " 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 at 380 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
'° 7 Id.
'°s See United States v. Beanie, 522 F.2d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.)
("A subpoena demanding that an accused produce his own records is ... the equivalent
of requiring him to take the stand and admit their genuineness."); People v. Defore,
242 N.Y. 13, 27, 150 N.E. 585, 590 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("A defendant is 'protected
from producing his documents in response to a subpoena duces tecum, for his produc-
tion of them in court would be his voucher of their genuineness.' ").
'" 425 U.S. at 414.
"° Id, at 413.
111
111 See id, at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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IV. PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PAPERS UNDER THE THREE-PRONGED
TEST
In holding that the production of the documents in Fisher in-
volved no compelled testimonial self-incrimination on the part of the
taxpayers, the Court specifically refrained from reaching the question
of whether an individual's own tax records in his possession would be
privileged documents. 13 Citing Boyd, the Court noted that the papers
demanded in Fisher were not "private papers."" 4 It would appear from
the Court's earlier discussion of Boyd, however, that protection of
documents under the fifth amendment no longer depends on their
private nature but rather on whether their production involves com-
pelled testimonial self-incrimination." 5 This limitation on the protec-
tion afforded "private papers" is the basis for Justice Brennan's fear
that the Fisher opinion constitutes a "serious crippling" of the protec-
tion of private papers. I I 6 Justice Marshall echoed that fear in noting
that the Court's examination left no room for recognition of the pri-
vate nature of documents.'" Justice Marshall also amplified Justice
Brennan's suggestion that a diary should always be accorded some
form of protection: 18 "[W]hile it may not be criminal to keep a diary,
or write letters or checks, the admission that one does and that those
documents are still available may quickly—or simultaneously—lead to
incriminating evidence."" 9
Despite the fact that the private nature of a document is not the
central consideration in determining fifth amendment protection,'" it
is likely that the production of a personal diary will inevitably result in
compelled testimonial self-incrimination on the part of the author and
therefore will be privileged under Fisher. The issues raised by the
subpoena of a personal document such as a diary would raise issues
similar to those mentioned by the Court in Fisher: the document's exis-
tence, its whereabouts and the possibility of its implicit authentication
incident to production. Unlike the tax documents in Fisher, however,
the existence and whereabouts of a personal diary would by no means
be foregone conclusions, but rather would be questions of fact which
the author would be most competent to answer. His production would
constitute testimonial evidence not substantially different from "re-
quiring him to take the stand and admit [its] genuineness."'" Clearly
13 Id. at 414.
"4 Id,
"3 See text at notes 58-62 supra.
16 425 U.S. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring).
'" Id. at 432 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"s Id. at 427 (Brennan, J., concurring). The private character of letters "would
seem to render them within the scope of the (fifth amendment] privilege. Papers in the
nature of a personal diary are a fortiori protected under the privilege." Id.
19 Id. at 433 (Marshall, J., concurring).
122 /cl. at 401.
' 2 ' See United States v. Beattie, 522 F.2d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1975), in which the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, held that a
taxpayer could not claim a privilege for tax records maintained by his accountant, even
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the author would thereby authenticate it as his own diary, in effect
vouching for its contents.' 22 To require an individual to produce his
own records under such circumstances would in effect be "to subject
those accused of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, per-
jury or contempt." 123 Therefore, it would appear that the fifth
amendment's protection would cover the attempted summons of any
document for use against its author. Thus, the fears of Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall are unwarranted because logically the production of
an individual author's private papers could rarely be compelled with-
out the risk of testimonial incrimination.
A similar analysis may be applied to the summons of any docu-
ment in the hands of one intimately familiar with its contents, whether
or not he is actually the author. A.document in one's guarded posses-
sion, the contents of which one attempts to maintain in confidence, is
likely to be implicitly authenticated through the act of compelled pro-
duction. Compelled production would often result in implicit authen-
tication because one intimately familiar with the contents of a given
document is usually capable of vouching for its genuineness. While
this might not hold true in every instance there would seem to be a
valid, though rebuttable presumption that one who maintains personal
records for his own use is usually sufficiently familiar with them to au-
thenticate them, whether or not they were actually authored by him.
His voucher would appear more persuasive the greater his familiarity
with the document and the more carefully guarded the information
therein, since it is likely that an individual is most capable of vouching
for documents over which he maintains personal and private control,
whether they are the products of his own hand or were authored by
another. Thus the fears of Justices Brennan and Marshal] that Fisher
represents an erosion of protection of privacy probably are not jus-
tified. Although the Court emphasized the testimonial aspects of pro-
duction rather than the private nature of the documents, it would ap-
pear that "private papers" would, in most if not all cases, continue to
be protected by the fifth amendment under Fisher, because any "pri-
vate paper" held in the private possession of an individual would be
so well-known to him that his release of the information demanded
would serve as a testimonial authentication of the document.
V. PRIVACY PROTECTION UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Notwithstanding the fact that the production of an individual's
though the taxpayer had taken actual possession of or acquired title to the papers. Id. at
278. The court noted, however, that production of records in response to a summons in
some circumstances could constitute implicit testimonial authentication of the records.
Beattie seems to be consistent with Fisher since the taxpayer apparently had no greater
familiarity with the documents of his accountant than did the taxpayer in Fisher. Given
his unfamiliarity with the documents the risk of his authenticating or verifying them is
not significant. See also B WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 at 380 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
122 See text at notes 112-13 supra.
123 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
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private papers would in most circumstances involve compelled tes-
timonial self-incrimination, it appears that even if private papers were
not immune under the fifth amendment they might find protection
under the fourth.'" The Court left that possibility open in Fisher, de-
clining to consider the issue because there was no privacy interest at
stake.' 28 The majority found it unnecessary to consider the issue of
privacy because the papers demanded were not the taxpayers' "private
papers."'" The Court noted that the fourth amendment did not pre-
vent the seizure of the workpapers in Fisher because the summonses
were quite specific and sought only unquestionably relevant mate-
rial.' 27 Because no "isipecial problems of privacy which might be pre-
sented by subpoena of a personal diary" were present, no fourth
amendment arguments could be successfully raised.' 28 Therefore the
Court was able to deal with Fisher solely on fifth amendment grounds
by applying the test of compelled testimonial self-incrimination with-
out looking into issues of privacy.
Although the Court found no privacy issues in Fisher, it noted
that privacy might be a relevant consideration in the subpoena of cer-
tain documents.'" Reference was made to United States v. Bennett,'" in
which Judge Friendly intimated that the seizure of a diary would be
offensive because of its infringement on basic concepts of privacy pro-
tected by the fourth amendment.'" It can be inferred from the
Court's comment as well as from the view it takes of protection of pri-
vacy that if "special problems of privacy" were involved in the produc-
tion of a document, it would be immune from a summons under the
fourth amendment regardless of whether it might be protected by the
fifth. Judge Friendly noted in Bennett that ' "the real evil aimed at by
the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's
privacy which consists in rummaging about among his effects to se-
cure evidence against him.' "132 It is the spectre of unlimited access to
an individual's personal effects which is offensive and against which
the fourth amendment protects. The "special problems of privacy" to
which the Fisher Court referred would seem to arise whenever the
government attempts to gain access to personal material meant only
for the eyes of the possessor. The dictum in Bennett indicates that the
fourth amendment allows an individual to carve out a private niche of
existence into which the government may not venture regardless of
'" As the Court pointed out, the fifth amendment protects against compelled
self-incrimination while protection of privacy is more properly a fourth amendment
consideration. See 425 U.S. at 400, 401 n.6.
122 1d. at 401 n.7, 414.
1 " Id. at 414.
117 Id. at 401 n.7.
'48
' 15 1d.
130
 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969).
'" Id. at 897,
132
 409 F.2d at 897, quoting United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir.
1930) (Hand, J.).
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how great the likelihood of discovering incriminating information.
Further, the Court has hinted broadly that the fourth amend-
ment might indeed protect evidence of a personal nature from pro-
duction. In Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden,' 33 the issue of
whether or not the fourth amendment provides an absolute privilege
to certain items of evidence having a confidential or private nature
was mentioned but not decided.' 34 Although that case involved pro-
tection of evidentiary items having no testimonial significance, its
reasoning concerning the protection of privacy would seem to apply
to items of testimonial value as well. In Hayden, the Court intimated
that privacy interests might in some circumstances provide complete
protection of evidence, by declining to decide "whether there are
items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from
being the object of a reasonable search and seizure." 135 Although the
Court decided the case without reaching the question, Judge Friendly
seized upon this caveat to remark, in Bennett, that fourth amendment
protection should be geared toward protection of privacy, leaving the
fifth amendment to protect against compulsory production of in-
criminating evidence.'" That interpretation squares with the holding
in Fisher, which regarded the purpose of the fourth amendment as
protecting privacy, while the fifth prevents an individual from being
forced to be a witness against himself.' 37
The proposition that the fourth amendment might immunize
private documents draws further support from the Supreme Court's
decision in Couch. The Court held therein that "no Fourth or Fifth
Amendment claim can prevail where, as in this case, there exists no
legitimate expectation of privacy and no semblance of governmental com-
pulsion against the person of the accused."'" No such legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy was found either in Bennett or in Couch. In Bennett
the evidence involved was a letter, found in the course of a legal
search,' 39
 containing incriminating but non-personal information.' 40
In Couch the Court held that there could be no legitimate expectation
of privacy when tax documents had been handed over to an accoun-
tant with full knowledge that much of the information would later be
disclosed."' The Court therefore held that the taxpayer in Couch had
no reasonable expectation of privacy. 142 It seems apparent, however,
that such an expectation does exist in the case of a document in the
nature of a personal diary. This is apparently the view of Justice Mar-
133 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
' 34
 /d. at 302-03.
"3 Id. at 303.
"" 409 F.2d at 896-97.
133 425 U.S. at 400-01.
'" 409 U.S. at 336 (emphasis added).
'" 409 F.2d at 897.
' 43 1d. at 896. The letter implicated the defendant in a conspiracy to distribute
heroin. Id.
141 409 U.S. at 335:
' 42
 id. at 335-36.
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shall, who expressed concern in Couch that the Court, in allowing the
seizure of documents, failed properly to address the issue of pri-
vacy. 143
 His dissent lends support to the proposition that fourth
amendment immunity should protect certain documents of a private
nature: "When this Court repudiated the 'mere evidence' rule, it
suggested that the Fourth Amendment limitations might be devised
precisely in terms of the interest in privacy, prohibiting the seizure of
'items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from
being the object of a reasonable search and seizure. ' "144 Justice Mar-
shall's language indicates that he is in agreement with the intimations
of the Court in Warden and Couch as well as Fisher that certain types of
evidence carry a legitimate expectation of privacy. Evidence of that
sort could never be the object of a reasonable search and seizure
under that line of reasoning, even if it were relevant to the investiga-
tion and, like the documents in Fisher, the object of a narrowly drawn
subpoena. Hence, the protection of the privacy of documents which
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall fear may be undermined by
Fisher probably continues to exist, although its basis might now be the
fourth rather than the fifth amendment.
VI. PROTECTION OF TAX RECORDS UNDER THE THREE-PRONGED
TEST
The fact that the Court specifically avoided deciding whether tax
records in the possession of a taxpayer are privileged under the fifth
amendment leaves room for speculation as to whether they would in-
deed be protected thereby. The taxpayer's interest in the privacy of
his tax records differs substantially from his interest in the privacy of
his letters, diary, or other personal documents. While the keeping of a
diary is purely voluntary, the taxpayer is required by law to maintain
tax records sufficient to enable him to file an accurate tax return. 145
143 See id. at 350-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 44 Id. at 349 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The "mere evidence" rule was first enun-
ciated in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), wherein the Court drew from
Boyd the proposition that search warrants may be used to seize evidence
only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the
interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to
be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of
the police power renders possession of the property by the accused un-
lawful and provides that it may be taken.
Id. at 309. Thus items could not be seized for use as "mere evidence" against their pos-
sessor in a criminal or penal proceeding unless the state had a superior right of posses-
sion. This distinction was rejected by the Court in Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), as an archaic concept, thereby making "mere evidence" a
legitimate subject of seizure in the same manner as instrumentalities and fruits of
crimes, and contraband. Id. at 300-01.
11 26 U.S.C. § 6001 (1970) provides in relevant part:
Every person liable for any tax imposed by this tide; or for the col-
lection thereof, shall keep such records, render such statements, make
such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary
or his delegate may from time to time prescribe.
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To the extent that record-keeping is mandatory the individual has no
choice but to yield his interest in privacy to the government's interest
in receiving correct tax information. Thus, tax returns are subject to
judicial process under some circumstances.'" If the information re-
quired by the government in returns is not privileged it would seem
that no fourth amendment argument could be raised to protect the
privacy of the records upon which those returns were based.
Although a fourth amendment defense would not likely succeed
against a subpoena of tax records, in all likelihood their production in
response to a summons would involve compelled testimonial self-
incrimination. An individual who maintains his own tax records and
makes his own calculations is as capable of authenticating those docu-
ments as were the accountants in Fisher. As the author of the docu-
ments, his production of them in response to a subpoena would vouch
for their genuineness. His implicit authentication would thus consti-
tute testimonial self-incrimination.
The protection of tax records under Fisher should not logically
be affected by the fact that the taxpayer is under a statutory duty to
keep such records, In this regard Fisher may be compared to Shapiro v.
United States, 147 in which the Court held that certain records required
by law are public records and not privileged under the fifth amend-
ment when a subpoena of those records is authorized by law.'" In
reaching that decision the Court relied on Wilson v. United States ! " for
the proposition that corporate documents are not privileged when
they are required by law to be kept."° The court found the docu-
ments in Shapiro to be similar to those in Wilson, even though Shapiro
involved a non-corporate sole proprietor."' The reasoning of the
Court was that because the documents were required by law they had
"public aspects" and were therefore not privileged under Boyd's pro-
tection of "private papers." 152 It would appear, however, that given
Fisher's requirement that fifth amendment protection can exist
' 48 26 U.S.C. § 7213 (1970) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States
to divulge or to make known in any manner whatever not provided by law
to any person the amount or source of income, profits, losses, expendi-
tures, or any particular thereof, set forth or disclosed in any income re-
turn, or to permit any income return or copy thereof ... to be seen or
examined by any person except as provided by law ....
Tax returns have been held to be subject to disclosure under court order. See, e.g., St.
Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 218-19 (1961) (dictum); United States v.
Liebert, 519 F.2d 542, 546 (3rd Cir. 1975) (dictum); Heathman v. United States District
Court, 503 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1974); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332
F.2d 602, 615 (2d Cir. 1964). In re Berkovitz, 367 F. Supp. 1059, 1063 (F.D. Pa. 1059)
(Grand Jury Subpoena).
147 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
148 1d. at 34-35.
' 9 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
'" 335 U.S. at 16.
151 Id.
16R Id. at 33.
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whenever compelled testimonial self-incrimination can be shown, the
important question is not whether a document is a "private paper" or
has "public aspects" but rather whether it meets the requirements of
the three-pronged test. Thus, the publidprivate distinctions of Wilson
and Shapiro would appear to be superseded by the compelled testimo-
nial self-incrimination requirement of Fisher.
The individual forced to produce his tax records from his own
possession would seem to authenticate them as effectively as if he
were producing a diary or other document of which he were the au-
thor. Although the existence and whereabouts of the records would
rarely be in doubt because of their required maintenance, their im-
plicit authentication through the act of production would represent
testimonial self-incrimination. Therefore, the subpoena of tax records
would appear to satisfy the Fisher test and would thus be barred by
the fifth amendment.
CONCLUSION
After Fisher an individual may assert a fifth amendment defense
to an order requiring production of papers or documents only when
their production would involve compelled testimonial self-
incrimination. Since those elements are not easily defined and may be
manifested in actions involving no testimonial statements, courts are
given wide latitude in applying the privilege. Although privacy was
not a controlling issue in Fisher, omission of its discussion does not
necessarily justify Justice Brennan's fears that Fisher represents "but
another step in the denigration of privacy principles." 53
 Rather, Fisher
would seem to be an attempt by the Court to separate issues of pri-
vacy from those of self-incrimination without lessening the protection
of either. Thus, while private documents may be privileged because
their production would result in compelled testimonial self-
incrimination, the Fisher holding seems to indicate the possibility that
certain documents would also be immune from summons because of
their private nature. Furthermore, the logical extension of Fisher's ra-
tionale would also seem to be that personal tax records, though
analogous to public documents, would nevertheless result in com-
pelled testimonial self-incrimination if their production were required.
Therefore, though the Court did not reach the issue, its reasoning in-
dicates that records prepared by a taxpayer and kept in his possession
should be immune from process. In providing a new fifth amendment
rationale for protecting papers, the Fisher holding essentially replaces
Boyd v. United States. The Court's reasoning represents a new approach
to the problem of protecting an individual from the compulsory pro-
duction of incriminating documents; an approach which should
nevertheless leave that protection basically unchanged.
S. LAMONT BOSSARD, j R.
153
 425 U.S. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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